feat(git): restrict submodule recursion and credential access - #208
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nidsnitesh wants to merge 2 commits into
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feat(git): restrict submodule recursion and credential access#208nidsnitesh wants to merge 2 commits into
nidsnitesh wants to merge 2 commits into
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The git credential helper validates the host but not the request context, so a malicious .gitmodules inside a scanned repository that points to another repo on the same host (e.g. github.com) would cause the helper to hand out the GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN to the attacker-controlled repo. This commit adds three layers of defense: 1. entrypoint.sh: Set submodule.recurse=false and fetch.recurseSubmodules=false via GIT_CONFIG_* environment variables so Git never automatically fetches submodules. 2. git-credential.sh: Detect submodule context by checking if GIT_DIR points under .git/modules/ and refuse to serve credentials in that case. 3. multiscan.ts: Pass -c submodule.recurse=false to all git commands in checkoutRevision() as SDK-level defense-in-depth.
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Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Hooray! Reviewed commit: ℹ️ About Codex in GitHubYour team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you
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Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request. Reviewed commit: Only the user who started this review can view the report in Codex. ℹ️ About Codex security reviews in GitHubThis is an experimental Codex feature. Security reviews are triggered when:
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Summary
Fixes a security issue where Git credential helpers could leak GitHub access tokens (
GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN) when processing submodules.Details
When scanning a repository, a malicious
.gitmodulesfile pointing to another repository on the same host (e.g.github.com) would cause Git's credential helper to be invoked for the submodule fetch. Since the helper checked the host but not the target repository path or context, it would hand out the token to the attacker-controlled repo.Fix
This PR implements 3 layers of defense-in-depth:
entrypoint.sh: Configuressubmodule.recurse=falseandfetch.recurseSubmodules=falsevia Git environment variables so submodules are never fetched automatically.git-credential.sh: Checks ifGIT_DIRpoints to a submodule context (*/.git/modules/*) and refuses to return credentials.multiscan.ts: Appends-c submodule.recurse=falseto checkout commands in the SDK.