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🤖 SemverChecks 🤖 No breaking API changes detected Note: this does not mean API is unchanged, or even that there are no breaking changes; simply, none of the detections triggered. |
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This PR caps the memory allocation for OP-TEE parameter passing to avoid potential DoS attacks. Note that OP-TEE OS does not specify this cap because it lets the secure-world kernel directly access the normal-world memory (which is subject to TOCTTOU attacks). In contrast, the OP-TEE shim copies data into the secure world memory, such that it should specify the cap. For now, the cap is 8 MiB.