feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型#6439
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feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型#6439c121914yu wants to merge 39 commits intolabring:mainfrom
c121914yu wants to merge 39 commits intolabring:mainfrom
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## 核心变更 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 ## 新增能力 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） ## 安全机制 - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 ## 依赖精简 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs ## 测试 - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局
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Pull request overview
This PR represents a complete architectural rewrite of the FastGPT code sandbox, migrating from NestJS + Fastify + isolated-vm to a Bun + Hono + subprocess-based architecture. The primary goal is to unify JavaScript and Python execution under a common subprocess model while implementing comprehensive multi-layer security and optional process pooling.
Changes:
- Replaced NestJS/Fastify HTTP framework with lightweight Hono, reducing dependency footprint by ~6 packages
- Migrated from isolated-vm to Bun subprocess execution for JavaScript, unifying the execution model with Python
- Implemented multi-layer security: static code analysis, process isolation, runtime API restrictions, and filesystem sandboxing
- Added process pool infrastructure (though not currently integrated) for potential performance optimization
- Introduced comprehensive test suite using vitest (67 tests across unit, security, and integration)
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 43 out of 44 changed files in this pull request and generated 13 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| package.json | Dependency overhaul: removed NestJS ecosystem, added Hono, updated to v5.0.0 |
| tsconfig.json | Updated compiler options for Bun/ESNext module resolution |
| vitest.config.ts | New test configuration for vitest framework |
| src/index.ts | New Hono-based HTTP server with bearer auth and simplified routing |
| src/config.ts | Centralized environment configuration with validation limits |
| src/types.ts | Core type definitions for execution options, results, and pool management |
| src/runner/base.ts | Abstract base class implementing subprocess lifecycle and result collection |
| src/runner/js-runner.ts | JavaScript runner using Bun subprocess with module whitelist |
| src/runner/python-runner.ts | Python runner with import precheck and resource limits |
| src/runner/pool.ts | Process pool implementation with recycling and idle timeout (unused) |
| src/sandbox/js-template.ts | JavaScript execution template with security shims and SystemHelper |
| src/sandbox/python-template.ts | Python execution template with resource limits and import interception |
| scripts/warmup.mjs | JavaScript warmup script for process pool (has security issues) |
| scripts/warmup.py | Python warmup script for process pool (has security issues) |
| Dockerfile | Simplified multi-stage build using Bun and Python 3.11 Alpine images |
| test/* | Comprehensive test suite covering unit, security, and integration scenarios |
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added 9 commits
February 15, 2026 11:28
- JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现
Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns
- Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions
- New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else
- Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative
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📊 PR #6439 Code Review: Sandbox 重构（NestJS + gVisor → Bun 原生）
概述
这个 PR 将代码沙箱从 NestJS + Go(gVisor) 架构重构为 Bun 原生实现，工程量大，架构方向合理（去掉 Go 依赖、简化部署），测试覆盖全面。但核心问题是安全模型从内核级沙箱降级为应用层拦截，留下了几个可被利用的缺口。
📊 变更概览
- 作者: @c121914yu
- 分支: main ← feat/sandbox-v5
- 变更统计: +5079 -1079 行，57 个文件
✅ 优点
- 去掉 Go/gVisor 依赖，大幅简化部署和维护
- 统一 JS/Python 的 Runner 抽象（SubprocessRunner），代码结构清晰
- 进程池设计合理，支持预热、回收、空闲清理
- 测试覆盖非常全面：单元测试、安全测试、兼容性测试、集成测试
- SSRF 防护做了 DNS 预解析，比单纯 IP 检查更好
- Python
__import__hook 用闭包封装，比直接挂 builtins 属性更安全
⚠️ 问题汇总
🔴 严重问题（3 个，建议修复后合并）
- Python
open()未拦截 — 用户代码可直接读取宿主机任意文件（/etc/passwd等），测试中已承认此问题但标记为success: true - 安全模型整体降级 — 从 gVisor 内核级隔离降为应用层正则+hook，Python 有大量反射路径可绕过
- 进程池无并发上限 — 池空时无限创建新进程，高并发下可能 OOM
🟡 建议改进（4 个）
- JS Runner
new Function()原型链隔离不完整，constructor.constructor测试断言过于宽松 - SSRF 防护存在 DNS rebinding TOCTOU 窗口
- 磁盘配额是应用层软限制，Python
open()直接写文件可绕过 - stdout 结果解析依赖
JSON.parse(lastLine)，用户 print 合法 JSON 可能被误解析
🟢 可选优化（3 个）
- 测试硬编码依赖
httpbin.org，CI 环境不稳定 - 根
vitest.config.mts移除了 sandbox，需确保 CI 单独运行 codeReturn: any建议改为unknown
🧪 测试建议
- 补充 Python
open()/builtins.open的拦截测试 - 补充进程池并发压力测试（同时 acquire 超过 poolSize）
- 将
httpbin.org依赖改为本地 mock server
💬 总体评价
- 代码质量: ⭐⭐⭐⭐☆ (4/5) — 架构清晰，抽象合理
- 安全性: ⭐⭐⭐☆☆ (3/5) — 应用层拦截有明显缺口
- 性能: ⭐⭐⭐⭐☆ (4/5) — 进程池设计好，缺并发保护
- 可维护性: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ (5/5) — 比原架构大幅简化
🚀 审查结论
建议修改后合并 — 核心安全问题（Python open() 未拦截、进程池无上限）修复后即可合并。建议在部署文档中标注安全模型变更，推荐用户在容器层面补充隔离。
📍 详细代码评论见下方行级 review。
- Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README
- New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max)
- New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject
- base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed
Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing.
- SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible
1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试
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📊 代码审查报告：sandbox 安全审查
📋 变更概览
- PR: #6439 feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型
- 变更: +7236 -1080 行，60 个文件
- 核心源码: 1,287 行（11 个文件），测试: 4,608 行（15 个文件）
✅ 优点
- 四层纵深防御架构设计合理，层次清晰
- SSRF 防护使用 DNS 解析后校验 + resolved IP 连接，防 DNS rebinding
- 331 个测试用例覆盖面广，包含安全逃逸、边界、兼容性测试
- 代码量比旧版减少 57%，依赖大幅精简
- Semaphore 并发控制防止子进程爆炸
⚠️ 发现的安全问题及修复
🔴 严重问题（3 个，已修复）
1. Python HTTPS DNS Rebinding 未防护
- 📍
python-template.tsL211-226 - 原代码 HTTPS 请求保留原始 URL 不使用 resolved IP，攻击者可通过 DNS rebinding（第一次解析返回公网 IP 通过检查，第二次解析返回内网 IP）绕过 SSRF 防护
- ✅ 修复：HTTPS 也使用 resolved IP + 自定义 SSL context
2. Python __import__ Hook 在 finally 中被恢复
- 📍
python-template.tsL365-370（原代码） - finally 块尝试恢复原始
__import__，用户代码抛出异常后 import 拦截被解除，后续代码可自由导入任意模块 - ✅ 修复：移除 finally 中的恢复逻辑
3. JS process 对象未限制
- 📍
js-template.ts（缺失） - 用户代码可通过
process.binding('fs')、process.dlopen()等访问底层 Node/Bun API，绕过沙盒限制 - ✅ 修复：禁用
binding/dlopen/_linkedBinding/kill/chdir等危险 API，冻结process.env
🟡 建议改进（4 个，已修复）
4. Python 内部变量泄露
- 用户代码可访问
_os、_socket、_urllib_request等内部模块引用 - ✅ 修复：用户代码执行前
del清理所有危险模块引用
5. Python open() 整数 fd 绕过
open(0, 'r')传入整数文件描述符可绕过路径检查- ✅ 修复：拦截整数 fd 参数
6. API 无输入校验
- 请求体直接
as ExecuteOptions无校验，可传入超大代码或恶意字段 - ✅ 修复：使用 zod schema 校验，限制代码最大 1MB
7. SANDBOX_TOKEN 默认空无警告
- 生产环境忘记配置 token 时 API 完全无认证
- ✅ 修复：未配置时输出 WARNING 日志
🧪 测试
新增 test/security/security-fixes.test.ts，包含所有修复的回归测试用例。
💬 总体评价
- 代码质量: ⭐⭐⭐⭐☆ (4/5)
- 安全性: ⭐⭐⭐☆☆ → ⭐⭐⭐⭐☆ (修复后)
- 性能: ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ (5/5)
- 可维护性: ⭐⭐⭐⭐☆ (4/5)
🚀 结论
架构设计优秀，但存在几个可被利用的安全漏洞。已提交修复 commit (412ba96)，包含代码修复和回归测试。建议合并前在真实环境跑一遍完整测试套件。
- Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server)
- Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed
- Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files)
…ecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format
根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配
- JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing
…-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351
- Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures.
- ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing
- Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response
instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers)
- JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'}
- Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'}
- ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping,
wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure
- Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests
(httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox)
- Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools)
- All 318 tests passing, 0 failures
- test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report
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Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing.
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Feb 26, 2026
* feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 ## 核心变更 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 ## 新增能力 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） ## 安全机制 - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 ## 依赖精简 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs ## 测试 - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除，独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试，集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow，仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式，与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行（旧版）' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行（弃） * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local>
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Feb 26, 2026
* feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除，独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试，集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow，仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式，与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行（旧版）' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行（弃） * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local>
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* feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除，独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试，集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow，仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式，与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行（旧版）' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行（弃） * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local>
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Feb 28, 2026
* fix(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒，支持内置函数和网络请求 (#6462) * feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除，独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试，集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow，仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式，与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR #6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行（旧版）' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行（弃） * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> * perf: code sandbox * update action * Update projects/app/src/components/core/chat/ChatContainer/ChatBox/index.tsx Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * update timeout * update memory limit function * sandbox * perf: process poll * env template * feat: code tip * fix: code sandbox error tip * update memory limit fn * update memory limit fn * fix: test * fix: test * fix: sandbox --------- Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@fastgpt.io> Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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* fix(sandbox): 重构代码沙盒，支持内置函数和网络请求 (labring#6462) * feat(sandbox): 重写代码沙盒 - Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型 - 运行时: Node.js → Bun - HTTP 框架: NestJS + Fastify → Hono - JS 执行: isolated-vm → Bun 子进程（与 Python 统一） - 架构: 统一子进程模型，JS 和 Python 共享同一套执行引擎 - SubprocessRunner 基类，JS/Python 各自继承 - ProcessPool 进程池预热（SANDBOX_JS_POOL_SIZE / SANDBOX_PYTHON_POOL_SIZE） - SystemHelper 命名空间（JS 端保留向后兼容全局函数） - 临时文件系统隔离 + 路径遍历防护 + 磁盘配额 - 请求级资源限制（timeoutMs / memoryMB / diskMB） - JS: 原型链冻结 + Bun API 禁用 + Function 构造器注入 safe require（模块白名单） - Python: 宿主侧正则预检 + __import__ 拦截 + resource 限制 - 移除: @nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjs - 新增: hono - 保留: tiktoken - 新增用户可用包: lodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs - 67 个测试全部通过（单元测试 + 安全测试 + 集成测试） - vitest 独立配置，不影响全局 * fix(sandbox): 安全加固 - 扩展 Bun API 封锁、清理 process.env、闭包封装 Python import 拦截 - JS: 扩展 Bun 危险 API 封锁列表（serve/connect/listen/udpSocket/dns/plugin/build/Transpiler） - JS: 清理 process.env，仅保留沙箱必要变量，防止泄露敏感环境变量 - Python: 用闭包封装 _safe_import，del 掉 _original_import/_make_safe_import/_BLOCKED_MODULES 防止用户代码恢复原始 __import__ - Dockerfile: 复制 bun.lock 并使用 --frozen-lockfile 确保构建可复现 * fix(sandbox): 将 sandbox 从 pnpm workspace 中移除，独立管理依赖 * fix(sandbox): 从全局 vitest 移除 sandbox 测试，集成测试无 SANDBOX_URL 时跳过 * ci(sandbox): 添加独立测试 workflow，仅 sandbox 代码变更时触发 * refactor(sandbox): 使用 export default 启动方式，与 sandbox_server 保持一致 * fix: sandbox security hardening & comprehensive test suite Security fixes: - JS: freeze Function constructor to block constructor.constructor escape - JS: handle undefined return from main() (serialize as null) - Python: fix http_request using from-import after __import__ interception - Python: __import__ whitelist mode blocks exec/eval import bypasses New tests (223 passing): - security/escape-attacks: JS/Python escape attack vectors - security/network-security: IP blacklist, protocol restrictions, httpRequest - compat/legacy-js: 18 backward compatibility tests - compat/legacy-python: 21 backward compatibility tests - boundary: timeout, memory, disk, edge cases - examples: common user code patterns * feat(sandbox): env vars for all limits + rewrite README - Network limits configurable via env: SANDBOX_MAX_REQUESTS, SANDBOX_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_RESPONSE_SIZE - Resource upper bounds configurable: SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT, SANDBOX_MAX_MEMORY_MB, SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB - README: architecture, API docs, env var reference, how to add JS/Python packages, security overview, built-in functions * refactor(sandbox): extract env.ts with dotenv for typed env loading - New env.ts: dotenv.config() + typed helpers (str/int/bool) - config.ts re-exports env for backward compatibility - index.ts imports env first to ensure .env loaded before anything else * refactor(sandbox): use zod for env validation and type coercion - Replace manual parseInt/str helpers with zod schema + coerce - Invalid env vars now fail fast with formatted error on startup - dotenv + zod, clean and declarative * chore(sandbox): remove unused process pool code - Delete pool.ts and pool.test.ts (pool was never wired into runners) - Remove PoolConfig/PooledProcess types - Remove pool env vars from env.ts - Clean up README * feat(sandbox): add concurrency limiter with semaphore - New Semaphore utility for max concurrent subprocess control - SANDBOX_MAX_CONCURRENCY env var (default 50) - Excess requests queue instead of spawning unbounded processes - Health endpoint exposes concurrency stats (current/queued/max) * test(sandbox): add semaphore tests and expand coverage to 292 cases - New semaphore.test.ts (11 tests): acquire/release, queuing, FIFO, stats, serial execution - JS runner: blank code, template literals, primitive returns, more modules, unicode, partial limits - Python runner: blank code, triple quotes, primitive returns, unicode, null vars, division errors - JS security: process.exit, globalThis, Symbol.unscopables, Proxy, dynamic import, path traversal - Python security: pickle/multiprocessing/threading/ctypes/signal, exec bypass, __subclasses__ - Escape attacks: type() class creation, __builtins__ tampering, getattr access - Boundary: long vars, special JSON chars, float precision, big ints, circular refs, Promise.reject * test(sandbox): test-master review - add 31 tests, coverage report - base-runner.test.ts (10): BaseRunner precheck, temp dir, semaphore integration - semaphore-race.test.ts (5): race conditions, rapid acquire/release, stress test - coverage-gaps.test.ts (16): security coverage gaps found during review - REVIEW-REPORT.md: full test audit report Total: 323 passed, 0 failed * fix(sandbox): address PR labring#6439 review issues Security fixes: - Intercept Python builtins.open(), restrict file access to sandbox tmpdir - Remove unused pool.ts, warmup.mjs, warmup.py (security risk) - Fix DNS rebinding TOCTOU: use resolved IP for HTTP connections - Fix symlink path traversal: use realpath instead of normpath - Add try/finally cleanup for __import__ hook Robustness: - Add __SANDBOX_RESULT__ prefix to stdout parsing, prevent user output interference - Fix disk quota tracking: deduct old file size on overwrite - Add __import__() pattern scanning in Python precheck Tests: - Fix eval+__import__ test assertion (accept both catch and fail paths) All 323 tests passing. * fix(sandbox): remove warmup scripts COPY from Dockerfile * docs(sandbox): add technical design document * feat(sandbox): configurable module allowlist/blocklist via env vars - SANDBOX_JS_ALLOWED_MODULES: JS require whitelist (comma-separated) - SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES: Python import blacklist (comma-separated) - Defaults unchanged, fully backward compatible * fix(sandbox): 修复多个安全漏洞 1. Python HTTPS DNS rebinding: HTTPS 请求现在也使用 resolved IP 发起连接 2. Python __import__ hook 恢复漏洞: 移除 finally 块中恢复原始 __import__ 的代码 3. Python 内部变量泄露: 用户代码执行前删除 _os, _socket 等内部模块引用 4. JS process 危险 API: 禁用 process.binding/dlopen/kill/chdir 等，冻结 process.env 5. Python open() fd 绕过: 阻止通过整数文件描述符绕过路径检查 6. API 输入校验: 使用 zod schema 校验请求体，限制代码大小 1MB 7. 无认证警告: SANDBOX_TOKEN 未设置时输出生产环境警告 新增 security-fixes.test.ts 包含所有修复的回归测试 * test: consolidate security tests + add integration test suite - Merge 6 security test files into 1 consolidated security.test.ts (109 tests) - JS/Python module interception (precheck + runtime) - JS escape attacks (prototype, constructor, Reflect, globalThis) - Python escape attacks (__import__ hook, exec/eval, internal vars, __subclasses__) - SSRF protection (private IPs, cloud metadata, file protocol) - File system isolation (path traversal, fd, disk quota) - Variable injection attacks - API input validation - Add black-box integration test suite functional.test.ts (56 tests) - Basic operations (math, string, array, JSON, regex, Date, Promise, Map/Set) - Variable passing (string, number, complex objects, empty, multiple) - Whitelisted modules (crypto-js, moment, lodash) - SystemHelper/system_helper (fs, delay, strToBase64, httpRequest) - Error handling (syntax, runtime, undefined var, timeout) - Network requests (GET, POST) - Complex scenarios (CSV pipeline, recursion, class definition) - Remove 34 duplicate test cases across merged files - Total: 363 passed, 8 skipped (integration API tests need server) * fix(sandbox): z.record() zod v4 compatibility - add key type param * feat(sandbox): add .env.template with all config options and comments * refactor(sandbox): remove disk write support and temp filesystem * test(sandbox): remove all fs-related tests and add test case inventory - Remove fs read/write tests from unit, integration, boundary, examples - Remove path traversal, absolute path, open fd, builtins.open tests from security - Add comprehensive test/case.md with all 344 test cases categorized - All tests pass: 344 passed, 8 skipped, 0 failed * feat(sandbox): add GET /sandbox/modules API to list available packages and builtins * test(sandbox): add unit tests for GET /sandbox/modules API * refactor(test): rewrite api.test.ts to use app.request() - no external server needed * feat(sandbox): validate SANDBOX_TOKEN charset in env schema (ASCII printable only) * chore(sandbox): remove DESIGN.md and package-lock.json from PR * feat(sandbox): replace spawn-per-request with process pool architecture - Add ProcessPool (JS) and PythonProcessPool with long-lived worker processes - Workers communicate via stdin/stdout line-based JSON protocol - Pool size configurable via SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE env var (default 20) - Auto-respawn workers on crash - Semaphore-based queueing when requests exceed pool size Performance gains (simple functions): - JS: 22 QPS → 1,328 QPS (60x improvement) - Python: 14.7 QPS → 3,395 QPS (231x improvement) - Fix import.meta.dir compatibility for vitest (Node) environments - Export poolReady promise for test initialization - Add benchmark scripts to test/benchmark/ - All 354 tests passing (12 test files) * chore(sandbox): clean up unused files, update README with pool architecture - Remove test/REVIEW-REPORT.md, test/case.md, test/benchmark.ts (obsolete) - Rewrite README: pool architecture diagram, performance benchmarks, SANDBOX_POOL_SIZE config, project structure, health endpoint format * fix(sandbox): 修复进程池超时后 worker respawn 竞态条件 根因：超时 kill worker 后，exit 事件是异步的，release() 先执行时 worker 还在列表里，死 worker 被放回 idle 池，后续请求发给死进程。 修复： - 超时回调中先 removeWorker 再 kill，防止 release 归还死 worker - removeWorker 返回 bool，exit 事件中避免重复 respawn - 超时回调主动触发 spawnWorker 补充池 - release 检查 worker 是否仍在池中 - spawnWorker 完成时检查 waitQueue 直接分配 * fix: security hardening & test migration to process pool - JS worker: harden process object (kill/chdir/env freeze/binding/dlopen) - Python worker: stack-frame based __import__ hook to block exec/eval bypass - Python worker: BuiltinsProxy to prevent __import__ override via builtins module - Python worker: restricted __builtins__ dict in exec_globals (no internal refs) - Python worker: restore __import__ before each execution - Migrate all 9 test files from JsRunner/PythonRunner to ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool - Configure vitest for serial execution (pool size=1, fileParallelism: false) - Fix security test assertion for builtins tampering (success=true with escaped=false) - All 102 security tests passing * docs(sandbox): update README with accurate benchmark data, remove non-existent features - Update performance table with latest benchmark results (JS 1414 QPS, Python 4247 QPS) - Remove SANDBOX_DISK_MB/SANDBOX_MAX_DISK_MB env vars (not implemented) - Remove SystemHelper.fs.* / system_helper.fs.* docs (not implemented in workers) - Fix security section to match actual implementation - Update test count to 351 * refactor(sandbox): remove legacy runner/sandbox/template code - Delete src/runner/ (base.ts, js-runner.ts, python-runner.ts) - Delete src/sandbox/ (js-template.ts, python-template.ts, network-config.ts) - Delete test/unit/js-runner.test.ts, test/unit/python-runner.test.ts - Keep src/utils/semaphore.ts (generic utility, has its own tests) - Update README project structure and test count (297 cases) All functionality is now in src/pool/ (process-pool architecture). 297 tests passing, 0 failures. * test(sandbox): add process pool lifecycle/respawn/concurrency tests - ProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, worker crash respawn, timeout respawn, pool-full queuing, concurrent crash isolation - PythonProcessPool: init/shutdown/stats, timeout respawn, queuing - 14 new test cases, total 311 passing * fix(sandbox): ping/pong health check, replace httpbin.org with baidu.com - Worker health check: send actual ping message and verify pong response instead of only checking stdin.writable (detects stuck workers) - JS worker.ts: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - Python worker.py: handle {type:'ping'} → reply {type:'pong'} - ProcessPool/PythonProcessPool: rewrite pingWorker to send ping, wait for pong with timeout, replace worker on failure - Replace all httpbin.org URLs with www.baidu.com in tests (httpbin.org unreachable from China/Sealos Devbox) - Add 4 new health check tests (ping/pong for JS and Python pools) - All 318 tests passing, 0 failures * docs: add test report (test/README.md) and update README testing section - test/README.md: detailed report with 315 passed / 3 skipped / 0 failed - README.md: updated test section with coverage dimensions table and link to report * docs: add functional test cases checklist (110 cases) * fix(sandbox): fix Dockerfile Python env and import detection 1. Dockerfile: Remove broken multi-stage Python 3.11 copy. - The previous approach copied python3 binary from python:3.11-alpine but missed libpython3.11.so.1.0, causing Python pool init failure. - Now uses system Python from apk and installs pip packages directly. 2. worker.py: Fix false positive import blocking for third-party packages. - numpy/pandas were blocked because their internal 'import os' was detected as user-initiated (full stack scan found user code frames). - Changed to check only the direct caller frame: if the import comes from site-packages (third-party lib internals), allow it. - Direct user imports of blocked modules are still properly rejected. * fix(sandbox): block dynamic import() and restrict file system access Security fixes found during deep review: 1. JS: Block import() dynamic imports that bypass require whitelist. - import('fs') could read arbitrary files on the container. - Added static regex check to reject code containing import(). 2. Python: Restrict open() to prevent user code from reading files. - open('/etc/passwd') was accessible from user code. - Added _restricted_open() that checks caller frame: only allows stdlib/site-packages internal calls, blocks user code (<string>). 3. Python: Remove duplicate return statement in _safe_import. All 315 tests pass (3 skipped). * test(sandbox): add regression tests for import() and open() security fixes - JS: import('fs'), import('child_process'), import('os') blocked - JS: string containing 'import' not false-positive - Python: open('/etc/passwd'), open('/proc/self/environ'), open('/tmp/evil.txt', 'w') blocked - Python: numpy internal open() not affected (conditional on numpy availability) Total: 322 passed | 3 skipped (was 315 passed) * docs(sandbox): rewrite sandbox documentation with JS + Python coverage - Add Python language support documentation - Add httpRequest/http_request function docs - Add available modules list (JS whitelist + Python safe modules) - Add security restrictions section - Add practical examples (data processing, date calc, webhook signing) - Add JS/Python function name mapping table * docs(sandbox): use SystemHelper/system_helper for built-in functions Direct calls (countToken, delay, etc.) are deprecated (kept for compat). All examples now use SystemHelper.xxx() / system_helper.xxx(). * docs(sandbox): Python only show named-params style as recommended * feat(sandbox): unify Python SystemHelper API with camelCase aliases - Add camelCase aliases to Python SystemHelper: countToken, strToBase64, createHmac, httpRequest (matching JS API exactly) - Update docs to use SystemHelper uniformly for both JS and Python - snake_case methods (count_token, etc.) still work for backward compat * feat(sandbox): add matplotlib and increase HTTP timeout to 60s - Add matplotlib to Python dependencies - Increase HTTP request timeout from 10s to 60s (both JS and Python) - Update docs accordingly * docs(sandbox): split docs for old/new sandbox versions - sandbox.mdx → '代码运行（旧版）' for FastGPT ≤ 4.14.7 (URL unchanged) - sandbox-v5.mdx → '代码运行' for FastGPT ≥ 4.14.8 - Both pages cross-link to each other - meta.json updated: sandbox-v5 listed before sandbox * docs: rename old sandbox doc to 代码运行（弃） * refactor(sandbox): remove SANDBOX_TIMEOUT, use SANDBOX_MAX_TIMEOUT as unified timeout * fix(sandbox): add build dependencies for matplotlib in Dockerfile * refactor(sandbox): migrate Python from blocklist to allowlist for module control - Change SANDBOX_PYTHON_BLOCKED_MODULES to SANDBOX_PYTHON_ALLOWED_MODULES - Update Python worker to use allowlist instead of blocklist - Add comprehensive safe module list: math, json, datetime, numpy, pandas, etc. - Improve error message: 'Module X is not in the allowlist' - Consistent with JS allowlist approach for better security * fix(sandbox): add _strptime to allowlist and update test assertions - Add _strptime module (required by datetime.strptime) - Update test assertions for Python module import errors - All 325 tests now pass (322 passed, 3 skipped) * fix(docs): center SVG icon in size-5 container on medium screens * docs(sandbox): simplify built-in functions and improve module documentation - Remove delay, countToken, strToBase64, createHmac functions (keep only httpRequest) - Convert Python module list to table format (10 tables by category) - Reorganize usage examples with collapsible sections (JS and Python) - Fix icon alignment in desktop/mobile sidebar navigation - All 325 tests passing --------- Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> * perf: code sandbox * update action * Update projects/app/src/components/core/chat/ChatContainer/ChatBox/index.tsx Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * update timeout * update memory limit function * sandbox * perf: process poll * env template * feat: code tip * fix: code sandbox error tip * update memory limit fn * update memory limit fn * fix: test * fix: test * fix: sandbox --------- Co-authored-by: Archer <archer@fastgpt.io> Co-authored-by: Lobster 3 <lobster3@sandbox.dev> Co-authored-by: OpenClaw Bot <bot@openclaw.ai> Co-authored-by: Archer <c121914yu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: archer <archer@archerdeMac-mini.local> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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概述
重写 FastGPT 代码沙盒（projects/sandbox/），从 NestJS + isolated-vm 架构迁移到 Bun + Hono + 统一子进程模型。
详细技术设计见
projects/sandbox/DESIGN.md。核心变更
架构
SubprocessRunner基类）安全机制（四层纵深防御）
__import__拦截（stdlib 帧检测）+ builtins.open 路径限制 + resource 限制网络安全（SSRF 防护）
SystemHelper.httpRequest()依赖精简
@nestjs/*(6个包)、fastify、isolated-vm、node-gyp、reflect-metadata、rxjshono、zodlodash、dayjs、axios、moment、uuid、crypto-js、qs配置系统
limits覆盖（不超过 MAX 上限）测试
331 个测试用例（323 passed / 8 skipped）：
API 兼容性
POST /sandbox/js、POST /sandbox/pythonsuccess字段包装limits参数countToken/strToBase64/createHmac/delay作为 deprecated 别名代码规模
性能